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 Abstract 
 
 
Candidate countries of central and eastern Europe (CEECs) are suppose to join the EU in 2004, June, 
which imply that they will face important challenges in the conduct of macroeconomic policy, in order 
to be able to enter the ERM-II system and eventually enter the EMU (European Monetary Union). 
Abandoning an independent monetary policy might entail significant costs for countries, which have 
succeeded in recovering and are in a process of catching-up. However those costs have probably been 
exaggerated, and their estimation biased by the traditional optimal currency area criteria. The main 
criticism against a too strong emphasis on the latter rests on two arguments. The first one is that 
assessing the trade-off for joining the EMU does not deliver the same conclusion ex ante and ex post. 
Meanwhile, the degree of financial integration will likely increase dramatically, which in turns will 
decrease the opportunity cost of loosing the monetary policy for absorbing country specific shocks. In 
a world of capital mobility, the room left for an independent monetary policy is very narrow, maybe 
close to zero in small, emerging countries, more vulnerable to speculative attacks than countries in the 
core. The second argument is more empirical. While the link between the exchange rate regime and 
the fundamentals is rather weak, the political agenda of joining the EU and subsequently the EMU 
seems to explain the choice of the exchange rate regime.  
 
Keywords: exchange rate arrangements, accession to the EMU, EU enlargement, international capital 
flows. 
 
JEL classification: F15, F41
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Introduction 
It is often argued that pegging the currency (and eventually adopting the euro) is optimal for two 
groups of countries: those for whom the benefits from stabilization largely exceed the cost of 
loosening their monetary policy; and those for whom the convergence process is sufficiently achieved 
to bring the degree of symmetry of business cycles close enough to a critical level. For countries, 
which enter the EU (European Union) in June 2004 and have achieved intermediate levels of 
restructuring, keeping their own currencies within the ERMII is an option as long as the process of 
increase in productivity gains continues. However the question of joining the EMU as soon as 
possible, even for these intermediary countries, is worth asking. The huge estimate of EU extra trade 
in Rose [2000] suggests indeed that fixing the currency does not only entail a significant cut-off in 
transaction costs, but it also significantly increases the degree of market integration while decreasing 
that of market imperfections2. It is true that loosing independent monetary policy might entail 
significant costs for countries, which have succeeded in recovering and are in a process of catching-
up. But those costs have probably been exaggerated, and their estimation biased by the traditional 
optimal currency area criteria. The main criticism against a too strong emphasis on the latter rests on 
two arguments. The first one is that assessing the trade-off for joining the EMU does not deliver the 
same conclusion ex ante and ex post. Meanwhile, the degree of financial integration will increase 
dramatically, which in turns will lower the opportunity cost of loosing the monetary policy for 
absorbing country specific shocks. In a world of increasing financial integration, the room left for an 
independent monetary policy is very narrow, maybe close to zero in small, emerging countries, more 
vulnerable to speculative attacks than countries in the core. The second argument is more empirical. 
While the link between the exchange rate regime and the fundamentals is rather weak, the political 
agenda of joining the EU and subsequently the EMU seems to explain the choice of the exchange rate 
regime. 
 
After reviewing the main arguments, which allow revisiting the traditional Optimal Currency Area 
criteria, we test in section 2 the Feldstein and Horioka [1980] hypothesis regarding the perfect capital 
mobility across European countries and across East European countries. We conclude that there is 
substantial room for increase in financial integration, which is likely to influence the ex post cost of 
loosing the monetary instrument. In section 3 we emphasize the quite substantial variation in exchange 
rate regimes, and we correlate in section 4 those observed exchange rate regimes across CEECs over 
                                                 
2 This second consequence might stem from the adoption of the monetary component of the Acquis 
Communautaire, that is strictly defined monetary and fiscal rules as well as informal ones (such as the stability 
pact, or the European Central Bank inflation target), which could influence the degree of capital market 
imperfection by lowering it. 
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the nineties, and the indicator of financial integration proposed by Feldstein and Horioka [1980]3. 
While there is a priori no clear relationship between the status of capital liberalization and the choice 
of monetary and exchange rate regime, the result illustrate that the CEECs have been prone to adopt 
fix exchange rate regimes in a context of increasing capital mobility. This is interpreted in a 
framework where the choice of entering a Custom Union is a mostly exogeneous and political 
decision, as in Flandreau and Maurel [2001], and where this choice depends crucially upon the 
specific conditions faced in Central and Eastern Europe, namely the EU enlargement.  
 
Section 1: revisiting the traditional OCA criteria 
 
Assessing the cost of unilateral euroization can be done in the framework of the Mundell’s well-
known theory. Besides the fact that loosing the instrument of monetary policy can be costly in the 
presence of asymmetric shocks, when labour mobility is low and prices are rigid, the cost 
encompasses the loss of seigniorage and loss of Lender of Last Resort. While the former is usually 
fairly low, of the probable order of 1-2 percent of GDP according to Schobert [2001] in countries, 
which stabilised, in principle the function of Lender of Last Resort can be partially fulfilled by the 
Central Bank of the new common currency. In addition, according to Feige [2003], the level of 
dollarisation and euroisation in CEECs is fairly high4. The percent of total currency held as foreign 
currency ranges from 6% in Hungary to 35% and 41% in respectively Croatia5 and Bulgaria. This 
implies a much weaker efficiency of domestic monetary policy and fiscal policy, foreign cash 
transactions corresponding to a switch toward the underground economy.  
 
In the case of an enlarged Europe including Eastern countries, labor mobility is as low as within EU 
core countries, prices are supposed to be rigid, and fiscal transfers limited in the framework of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Last but not least, the degree of symmetry of shocks, which is already low enough 
among EU member countries, is even lower between East-West countries6. But one cannot assess ex 
ante the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) criteria, because the mere fact of entering a monetary union 
influences the way those criteria are satisfied. There is a large debate indeed, initiated by Frankel and 
                                                 
3 The Feldstein Horioka indicator is the difference between gross domestic savings to GDP and gross domestic 
investment to GDP. 
4 It is calculated on the basis of systematic information on cross border flows of US currency : “The Currency 
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act […] requires persons or institutions importing or exporting currency or 
other monetary instruments in amounts exceeding 10,000 to file a Report of International Transportation of 
Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR) ”.  For other currencies holdings, a series of surveys conducted in 
several CEECs by the Austrian National Bank commissioned Gallup have been used. Feige [2003, pages 363 
and 366]. 
5 Kraft [2003] argues that the level of dollarisation/euroisation in Croatia limits the manoeuvring room for 
monetary policy.  
3 
Rose [1998] and Rose [2000], on the issue whether asymmetry fosters trade integration or not, and 
vice versa. Rose [2000] shows that (i) membership in a currency union increases trade by a factor of 
three, while Frankel and Rose [1998] demonstrate that (ii) the higher the degree of trade integration, 
whether specialized or intra-sector, the higher the co-variation of economic cycles. If entering a 
monetary union according to (i) favors trade integration, this in turn according to (ii) makes symmetric 
shocks more likely, thus reinforcing the very sustainability of the CU.  
 
However, these findings are based on mainly empirical evidence and there are at odd with the 
argument that specialization should increase the probability of asymmetric shocks. It might be that the 
focus on the supply side has been overemphasized. Flandreau and Maurel [2001] analyze the impact of 
monetary arrangements on trade integration and business cycle correlation in a more comprehensive 
framework. Focusing on late 19th century Europe, they formalize the demand forces induced by co-
ordination of public policies alongside the specialization forces7. By this means, they are able to 
isolate the negative impact of trade integration on business cycles via the specialization channel, but 
this negative impact is overcompensated by the positive impact of public policy co-ordination. And as 
a result, the net effect of a CU on trade integration is positive. Then business cycles are used as a 
proxy for the external constraint. The basic assumption is that when business cycles are at odd, and 
when the financial market is reluctant to finance unbalances because of capital imperfections, the 
external constraint is binding and has a negative impact on trade. Conversely symmetry allows imports 
to be financed through exports in a smoother way. In a framework of two simultaneous equations, the 
authors calculate the extra trade generated by memberships into the Autro-Hungarian monetary Union, 
which is somehow intriguingly three times the average trade as in the controversial Roses’s paper 
[2000]. This extra trade is part of the benefit from entering a Currency Union. No need to say that an 
order of magnitude of three times makes any other argument useless.  In the Flandreau and Maurel’s 
[2001] paper the main characteristic of a Currency Union lies on the coordination of the monetary 
policy and the resulting decrease in financial market imperfection. It rests on the assumption that 
asymmetry of business cycles decreases the case for making a monetary union.  
 
This latter assumption is put into question in a recent paper by McKinnon [2002], who emphasizes 
also the financial criteria in the debate about the optimality of a Currency Union, but from the supply 
side. He recalls that somehow paradoxically, Mundell itself considered asymmetry to be a good reason 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 See Fidrmuc [2003] for an assessment of labor mobility in Eastern Europe, Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1993], 
for the low symmetry of EU shocks, Horvath and Ratfai [2004] for the even lower symmetry of East-West 
shocks. 
7 While Austria was specialised in Industry, Hungary was predominantly agricultural, which is not far from the 
actual pattern we observe between, say, Germany, and Poland, or Romania. 
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for joining a monetary union8: “[He] showed how having a common currency across countries can 
mitigate such shocks by better reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. Under a common 
currency, a country suffering an adverse shock can better share the loss with a trading partner because 
both countries hold claims on each other’s output. Whereas, under a flexible exchange rate inhibiting 
portfolio diversification, a country facing an adverse shock and devaluing finds that its domestic-
currency assets buy less on world markets. The cost of the shock is now more bottled up in the country 
where the shock originated (McKinnon, 2002, page 348).” Under a common currency, the risk of 
defaults on the redeemability of currencies is abolished. The country experiencing a bad event does 
not devaluate, and the other country agrees automatically on the internal price adjustment, which 
allows sharing the loss with the bad event and currency union member country (and symmetrically 
sharing the gain if a positive shock occurs).  
 
In Mundell’s paper the risk sharing is limited to money as the only financial asset. But McKinnon 
(2002) emphasizes that international diversification should be questioned for a broader set of financial 
assets9. He argues that it is inhibited by a principal-agent problem. Holdings of bonds by individuals 
are indeed general claims on financial intermediaries, which are not neither monitored nor controlled 
directly. The easiest way to solve the resulting principal-agent problem is to choose domestic money 
as the principal money, which leads to hypothesize that “the fixed value of bonds held by domestic 
nationals the world over is largely denominated in the local (national) currency” (McKinnon, 2002, 
page 353). This hypothesis echoes the long-standing literature on international capital flows and 
capital mobility. In the same way as capital flows are not sufficient for equalizing the yield to 
investors, or put in other words the saving that originates in a country tends to remain to be invested in 
this country, individuals tend to hold bonds denominated in national currency or to invest their savings 
domestically. Another approach for explaining the strong home bias in assets holding is to consider the 
                                                 
8 According to Mundell (1973, page 115): “A harvest failure, strikes, or war, in one of the countries causes a 
loss of real income, but the use of a common currency (or foreign exchange reserves) allows the country to run 
down its currency holdings and cushion the impact of the loss, drawing of the resources of the other country 
until the cost of the adjustment has been efficiently spread over the future.” More precisely (Mundell, 1973, page 
119): “Suppose that the two countries agree on the creation of a common currency. Before the spring harvest 
Capricorn puts into a world bank 50 units of the claims it holds on Cancer’s spring crop, and gets in exchange 
50 units of world money. When the spring crop emerges the Capricornians use their world money to buy 50 units 
of Cancer money from the bank of Cancer (which has agreed to accept world money) with which they buy half 
the spring crop ; and then the Cancerians exchange their 50 units of Cancer money for 50 units or world money. 
[…] At this point there will not to have been a gain to the system as a whole by the amalgamation of the two 
monies. But the gain appears when the variability of the crops is taken into account. For example, suppose again 
that the spring crop in Cancer is below the average, let us say at 70 units. Then Caprincorn consumers hold 50 
units of the world money as do Cancer producers. […] the 100 units of world money will exchange for the 70 
units of food irrespective of who holds the money ; this is because competition and freedom of arbitrage assure 
the single price. The price of a unit of food thus rise to 100/70 for both Capricornians and Cancerians and the 
burden of the harvest fluctuation is met equally by the two islands. The common cyurrency assures an automatic 
and equal sharing of the risk of the fluctuations. ”  
9 Broader than M1, which represents a few percent of GDP in financially sophisticated economies, and a few 
percent of the total stock of private sector liquid assets (M3). 
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impact of exchange rate uncertainty on the distribution of capital across industries and across 
countries. While within the boundaries of a country one is entitled to assume that “highly paid analysts 
estimate the future risk and return of industry X against the general market, and winning firms against 
the others, which increase industrial efficiency” (McKinnon, 2002, page 358), the impossibility of 
predicting exchange rates, which behave like random walks, induce the same experts to recommend, 
for any one industry, lesser holdings denominated in foreign currency than in the domestic currency.  
 
Section 2: estimating the potential for international risk sharing and further 
financial integration 
 
The previous section concludes by inverting the traditional Mundel’s criteria in stating that more 
symmetric countries benefit more from a common currency zone. It illustrates that sharing the risk of 
asymmetric shocks by joining a monetary union delivers higher payoffs for countries, which being 
specialized face a higher degree of shocks asymmetry, or for countries, which become more 
specialized as the very result of the monetary union. The purpose of this section is to estimate the 
potential for international risk sharing facing the CEECs, presumably specialized with respect to EU 
core member countries.  
 
Our strategy is to measure the level of international capital flows, which indeed reflects the domestic 
bias analyzed by McKinnon (2002), that is the extent to which domestic saving tends to remain to be 
invested in the country. For assessing what it could within the EMU enlarged towards CEECs we 
apply the methodology proposed in Feldstein and Horioka [1980] to a sub-sample of EU actual 
member countries and to a sample of CEECs over the nineties. We estimate therefore equations of the 
form:  
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the share of trade in GDP.  
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The sample consists of 15 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United-Kingdom, Finland, Ireland), seven 
CEECs (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, The Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia), and three 
Baltic State (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). The time span covers the period from 1989 to 2001. The size 
of the panel10 provides a basis for consistent estimation. Domestic saving and investment as a fraction 
of GDP come from the World Bank Indicators CD-ROM.  
 
Table 1 Mean Gross Domestic Saving and Investment Ratios for Western EU countries 
and Eastern and European countries, 1989-2001 
 
Saving in percent of 
GDP 
Capital in percent of 
GDP 
Absolute difference in 
percent of GDP 
Western and  European Countries 
Austria 23.79 23.49 0.71 
Belgium 24.17 20.66 3.51 
Finlande 25.45 20.17 6.08 
France 21.33 19.97 1.40 
Germany 23.43 22.12 1.44 
Greece 13.25 20.98 7.73 
Italy 22.12 19.46 2.66 
Netherlands 26.78 21.64 5.15 
Portugal 18.40 25.24 6.84 
Spain 22.54 23.45 1.35 
Sweden 22.32 17.68 4.64 
Switzerland 25.88 22.29 3.60 
United Kingdom 16.22 17.44 1.32 
Norway 30.43 21.86 8.58 
Luxembourg 33.75 22.41 11.36 
Average 23.32 21.25 4.42 
Eastern and European Countries 
Bulgaria 15.99 17.92 4.16 
Czech Republic 27.88 29.23 3.37 
Estonia 22.68 28.07 7.56 
Hungary 23.31 25.08 2.69 
Latvia 24.83 26.75 7.51 
Lithuania 16.54 22.93 8.39 
Poland 22.05 22.99 3.70 
Romania 17.76 24.13 6.38 
Slovak Republic 25.06 30.02 5.93 
Slovenia 23.42 22.77 3.33 
Average 21.95 24.98 5.30 
The number of CEECs observations (EU observations) is 124 (192); Numbers in brackets are 
t-statistics.  
Source: World Bank Indicators CD-ROM 
 
                                                 
10 130 (13 years * 10 countries) observations for CEECs and 195 (13 years * 15 countries) for EU countries. 
Because of missing values we are left with respectively 124 and 192 observations.  
7 
Table 1 reflects the quite substantial variation in domestic saving and investment ratios among the 
Western EU countries. For the period 1989-2001, the ratio of gross domestic saving to gross domestic 
product averages 23%. This saving rate varies from a high 33% in Luxembourg to a low 13% in 
Greece. The corresponding ratios of gross domestic investment to gross domestic product also show 
substantial variation. The 13-years average gross investment ratio has a mean of 21%. Saving is higher 
than capital, which points to a capacity of providing higher returns countries with this available 
saving. A quite substantial variation characterizes also the patterns of saving and investment across 
Central and Eastern European countries. Most importantly investments (25%) exceed saving (22%), 
which illustrate that they are investment opportunities in those high growth and catching-up countries. 
 
Table 2 below reports estimates of the basic equation 1 over the whole period as well as for sub-
periods. With perfect capital mobility, an increase in the saving rate in country i would cause an 
increase in investment in all countries. Depending upon the size of country i, more precisely upon its 
initial capital stock and its elasticity of capital schedule, the savings coefficient beta is expected to 
vary from zero (small country) to country i’s share of total world capital. For the perfect capital 
mobility assumption to be valid, beta has to be significantly lower than one. As stated in Feldstein and 
Horioka [1980], for OECD countries and over 1960-1974, it should be less than 0.10.  
 
In most empirical studies11 empirical analysis fails to validate the assumption of a world of perfect 
capital mobility. Frankel [1992] mentioned different points, which have been made for explaining this 
failure. Firstly, national saving might be endogeneous12, implying that the estimated beta is biased 
upwards. The second explanation lies in the fact that for large countries, the interest rate is not 
exogeneous, and determines both national savings and investment13. The third explanation is that real 
interest parity does not hold, because of the existence of currency factors, namely currency premium. 
Of course if there are differences in rates of return across countries, the Feldstein-Horioka condition 
cannot be observed.  
 
                                                 
11 For an exhaustive review of the literature one can consult the excellent paper by Flandreau and Riviere [1999], 
where about 16 references are listed and commented. The main thesis of the authors is that the move towards a 
financially integrated world is very recent, it starts at the beginning of the nineties, and is limited to Europe and 
OECD countries. Our results are quite compatible with this view.  
12 The point that saving and investment are co-cyclical has been recently emphasized in a framework where both 
variables are cointegrated with a long-run unit coefficient. The difference between them, the current account 
balance, is a stationary process. The lower Feldstein-Horioka cross-section regression coefficient for developing 
countries is due to a policy response, which is less capable of restoring current account balances. See Coakley, 
Hasan, and Smith [1999].  
13 Those explanations are not really satisfactory, in as much as the use of instruments does not help to reduce the 
estimated beta. 
8 
Our results are quite interesting. Where others have failed, we succeed in illustrating a great deal of 
financial integration across European countries14, whatever the procedure used. It is worth mentioning 
that the fixed-effects procedure allows eliminating the endogeneity coming from a correlation between 
any non-observed time-invariant variable and the residuals. Over the whole period estimates vary from 
0.09 (between estimates) to 0.16 (random estimates), and after 1995 they do not differ significantly 
from zero. This result supports the idea introduced by Frankel [1992] that the failure of the Feldstein-
Horioka test may in fact be due to currency factors. Further empirical support is provided by Bayoumi 
and Rose [1993]. As in the case of the EU in the late 90ies, they find no positive correlation between 
saving and investment across national regions15. Harvey and alii [1996] duplicate the Bayoumi and 
Rose [1993] result but for the pre-1995 twelve members of the EU during the period 1971-199116.  
 
Table 2a The Relation between Domestic Saving Ratios and Domestic Investment Ratios 
 EU countries CEECs 
 Random 
effects 
Fixed effects Between 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed effects Between 
effects 
Whole period 0.16 
(2.76) 
0.19 
(2.71) 
0.09 
(0.86) 
0.54 
(9.23) 
0.52 
(8.54) 
0.72 
(3.58) 
Before 1995 0.35 
(4.24) 
0.61 
(5.01) 
0.15 
(1.41) 
0.62 
(8.23) 
0.63 
(7.78) 
0.54 
(2.48) 
After 1995 0.018 
(0.27) 
-0.0017 
(-0.02) 
0.05 
(0.46) 
0.69 
(5.01) 
0.59 
(2.81) 
0.76 
(4.15) 
Fandreau M. 
and Riviere 
C. (1999) 
0.339 
(13.03) 
 
0.681 
(6.42) 
 
0.224 
(6.4) 
   
The number of CEECs observations (EU observations) is 124 (192); Numbers in brackets are t-statistics.  
Source: World Bank Indicators CD-ROM 
Flandreau and Riviere  (1999) estimates are reported for the purpose of comparison. They run equation 1 for a 
sample of 24 countries, over a period of floating exchange rates: 1974-1996. 
 
By contrast CEECs face a quite substantial degree of rigidities and locational preference, despite the 
dramatic increase in opening the Eastern capital markets over the last decade. Let compare within 
estimates before and after the middle of the decade: equal to 0.61 and 0.63 for EU countries and 
CEECs, they are set equal to a number not significantly different from zero for EU countries but still 
high and significant for CEECs (0.59), which do not yet benefit from memberships into the wide 
                                                 
14 As suggested in the Flandreau and Riviere’s paper [1999], in which the very low process of financial 
integration is described as an historical long-term phenomena, which broke up during the two world wars while 
the nineties are characterized as having promoted its acceleration within old-industrialized countries including 
European ones. 
15 They compute the correlation of saving and investment across national regions, within the United Kingdom.   
9 
European financial market. This result suggests that memberships into the EU will bring about 
significant increase in financial integration and capital mobility. This increase in financial integration 
makes quite implausible the idea that flexible exchange rates allow independence in monetary and 
domestic policies; it decreases therefore the ex post opportunity cost of an early adoption of the euro.   
 
Table 2b below simply reports the estimates of equation 2, where the link between domestic 
investment and domestic saving is allowed to vary with the degree of openness of the economy. As 
emphasized in Feldstein and Horioka [1980, page 322], it is likely that small economies, more 
involved in international trade, have a much weaker link between domestic saving and domestic 
investment than large and nearly autarchic economies. The estimated coefficients of openness are 
negative as expected, although quite small.  
 
Table 2b The Relation between Domestic Saving Ratios and Domestic Investment Ratios 
 EU countries CEECs 
 Random 
effects 
Fixed effects Between 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed effects Between 
effects 
Savings 
coefficient 
0.43 
(4.76) 
0.59 
(5.60) 
0.083 
(0.48) 
0.43 
(4.97) 
0.43 
(4.70) 
0.51 
(1.59) 
Savings time 
openness 
coefficient 
-0.001 
(-3.82) 
-0.001 
(-4.87) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
0.001 
(1.71) 
0.000 
(1.29) 
0.001 
(0.90) 
The number of CEECs observations (EU observations) is 119 (192); 
Source: World Bank Indicators CD-ROM 
 
If that trade openness is often associated with capital mobility, a contrario, in a world of imperfect 
finance (i.e. low capital mobility), the current account constraint may become an obstacle when the 
financial system is reluctant to tolerate and finance growing bilateral trade imbalances. Flandreau and 
Maurel [2001] interpret the degree of symmetry of business cycles as a proxy for the need of financing 
the imbalances between import and export. They consider capital financial integration to be a 
substitute for the symmetry of business cycles and to promote trade integration. Results presented here 
support the view that financial integration allows sharing the risks17 (from the supply side), and 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 However this considerable degree of capital market integration is considered as puzzling. It is not observed 
during the period of increasing financial integration. Instead the authors observe a pronounced business cycle 
effect, implying that beta is positive (negative) during expansionary (recession) phases. 
17 As underlined in McKinnon  [2002, page 354], it is more useful when countries are more specialized and more 
exposed to asymmetric shocks: “Once risk-sharing through portfolio diversification in bond holding is properly 
weighted, the case for a monetary union becomes eve stronger as the constituent parts of the underlying 
economic union become more specialized in what they produce. Presumably, the productivity gain from greater 
regional specialization is one of the major benefits of having an economic cum monetary union in the first 
place!” 
10 
compensating for the negative impact the current account constraint has on the intensity of trade 
integration (from the demand side).  
 
Section 3: monetary and exchange rate regimes in transition economies 
 
Before turning to the relationships between the exchange rate regime and the degree of financial 
integration, this section aims at illustrating that, despite the current diversity in exchange rate regimes 
among transition countries, neither the economic fundamentals nor the traditional OCA criteria the 
point unambiguously in one direction as regards the regime choice: CEECs have made considerable 
progress in establishing fairly low levels of exchange rate variability and low inflation (see tables 3 
and 4); there is no evidence of a Balassa-Samuelson effect sufficiently substantial for making an 
argument against fixing the exchange rates; whatever their respective fundamentals, CEECs are small 
and vulnerable countries, often unable to benefit from the conduct of “independent” monetary and 
fiscal domestic policies.   
 
On the question of the appropriate exchange rate regime, different views are competing. In a recent 
IMF Policy Discussion Paper, Gulde et al. [2000] argue that currency board arrangements have 
favoured low inflation and higher growth. Furthermore, satisfying by definition the Maastricht criteria 
of no exchange rate variability and low inflation, currency boards may serve the way up to the 
adoption of the euro. Instead, Corker et al. [2000] emphasize the risk of speculative attacks at the eve 
of joining the euro area. Any exchange rate regime is feasible, from currency board to any more 
flexible exchange rate arrangement, but the most important is to be credible and sustainable in an 
environment of likely large capital inflows and asymmetric shocks. The bipolar view argues that in a 
world where countries have a large access to international markets and where capital moves freely, 
only two options are sustainable, flexible exchange rate and fixed exchange rate, both meaning a 
commitment to give up altogether an independent monetary policy. Whether this view is supported by 
empirical evidence is a matter of controversies. For Masson [2000] there is no statistical evidence that 
the number of transitions from intermediate exchange rate regimes towards polar ones is increasing 
over time, and this turns out to be particularly true for Transition Countries over the nineties, where 
the major (and recent) moves are towards an increasing number of intermediate regimes. Among 
CEECs (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), there is one currency board (in 
Estonia), and three moves from less flexible exchange rate arrangements towards more flexible ones 
(in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Romania and Slovakia moved from tightly managed to 
relatively free float, while Bulgaria, for stabilization purposes, implemented a currency board (see 
table 5). This diversity of exchange rate regimes in Central Eastern Europe is emphasized in a recent 
work by Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré [2000], who argue that once the regional dimension is accounted 
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for, there are more than two corner solutions. The authors emphasize that the perspective of a 
monetary union in the long run can make intermediate regime more robust in the meantime, and that 
these regimes must be managed through co-operation and economic policy co-ordination. 
 
CEECs have to make compatible the agenda of entering the EU and the catching-up process. These 
two objectives might turn out to be contradictory: joining the EU imposes low inflation and exchange 
rate variability, while higher than EU average growth implies higher inflation and exchange rate 
variability. Hence the very restructuring process would justify a monetary policy and exchange rate 
policy aiming at accommodating the adverse consequences of real appreciation and inflationary 
pressures, and would exclude participating into EMU in a near future; CEECs would have better to 
wait up to the uncertain date when the process of restructuring is over). A recent paper by Coricelli 
and Jazbec [2001] provides evidence that this widespread belief is overstated. The real exchange rate 
behavior is well influenced by structural reforms18, at least at the beginning of transition, but this 
influence diminishes through time, and finally stabilizes around the fifth or sixth year. “For several 
Central and Eastern European countries in the process of accession to the European Union, the 
dynamics of the real exchange rate can now be assimilated to that of previously acceding countries 
such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, with the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect playing a dominant 
role at later stages of transition.”  
 
Another argument bordering on the above Balassa Samuelson effect is that the probability of 
asymmetric shocks might be still high, requiring the use of an independent monetary and exchange 
rate policy. But if, following again Coricelli and Jazbec  [2001], we assume that the influence of 
asymmetric shocks imputable to restructuring is over, then the question is to know whether the cost of 
accommodating higher inflation and productivity gains by labour and price flexibility outweighs the 
benefit of being a member of the EU currency union. The same question was asked for Mediterranean 
countries when they were candidates. In Babetski et alii [2002], it is shown that the nineties have been 
characterized by an increase in the symmetry of demand shocks across EU and Transition countries: 
hence the cost of giving up monetary independence could be decreasing. Fidrmuc and Schardax 
[2000] argue that one explanation behind the increase in the symmetry of shocks lies in the pattern of 
trade (increasingly intra-industry). 
 
The choice of the exchange rate regime does not seem to have been determined by any particular 
economic situation: the wide range of exchange rate regimes is not correlated with fundamentals. 
Furthermore, CEECs often tried to manage their currency in order to be in compliance with Maastricht 
                                                 
18 Structural reforms are measured by the ratio of the workers employed in manufacture on the number of 
workers employed in services, and instrumentalised by the structural reform index of De Melo, Denizer and Gelb 
[1996] and total credit to the private sector (EBRD Transition Report, 1999). 
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criteria, even if the latter were not formally required for the countries under consideration19. Once they 
enter the EU, countries are left with the following three options: fix the currency at the price of an 
increase in unemployment and painful macro-economic adjustment, let short-run and long-run capital 
flow in at the risk of increasing financial instability, or join the EMU as soon as possible. The benefit 
from joining the EMU might far exceed the associated costs: it comes not only from budgetary 
transfers from the West, but also from the possibility of facing lower interest rates without raising 
uncertainty and increasing risk of speculative attacks20. In other words, joining EMU implies avoiding 
the difficult trade-off between on the one hand low interest rates but increasing financial vulnerability 
and high interest rates but increase in unemployment on the other. Coricelli [2002] emphasizes also 
that an early adoption of the euro would eliminate immediately both the vulnerability of the countries 
to sudden shifts in capital flows and the interest rate premium; it is the optimal exchange rate strategy 
in candidate countries. ERMII has two rationales: the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which requires 
exchange rate flexibility, and the necessity of finding an equilibrium level for the exchange rate. While 
the empirical evidence supporting the Balassa-Samuelson effect is rather weak21, it is clear that “the 
adoption of a wide band will generate high volatile capital flows that will cause exchange rate 
movements unrelated to movements in the fundamentals” (Coricelli [2002, page 412]). Mario Nuti 
[2002] goes still further: “there is no legal or economic justification for EU aversion to unilateral 
euroization in accession candidate countries”. 
 
Section 4: international capital flows matter for the exchange rate regime choice 
 
Feldstein and Horioka [1980] emphasise that the international mobility of the world’s supply of capital 
is crucial for analysing a wide range of issues, including the optimal rate of saving and the incidence 
of tax changes. One should add to this wide range of issues the room left for monetary policy 
independence under a fixed exchange rate regime, as emphasised previously, and symmetrically the 
extent of fiscal policy independence under a flexible exchange rate regime. As we know from the 
traditional Mundellian analysis, an increase in financial integration lowers the efficiency of fiscal and 
monetary policies. In other words, in the same way it can change the incidence of tax changes, the 
international mobility of capital might undermine a policy aiming at absorbing asymmetric shocks 
(whatever the nature of the exchange rate regime, flexible or fixed). In addition this international 
mobility of capital is far from occurring in a world where the perfect financial markets postulate holds. 
Bubbles, multiple equilibriums, imperfect information, which are a very probable feature of 
contemporary financial markets, and the increasing capital mobility have raised the consensus 
                                                 
19 See Gomulka [2001] and Coricelli [2002].  
20 The financial gain is emphasized in Flandreau and Maurel  [2001]. 
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amongst economists that removing capital movement restrictions has brought about increased 
financial instability, and that the greater capital mobility makes very difficult the credibility and 
sustainability of any exchange rate regime, whatever flexible or fixed22.  
 
In the specific case of CEECs what makes the difference between floating or fixing is the (political) 
commitment of entering the EU, adopting the euro, and giving up currency sovereignty for the 
economic gain of being member of a large economic entity. As emphasised in Daianu and Vranceanu 
[2002], the sequencing of capital account liberalization depends upon a range of country specific 
characteristics: the success of macroeconomic stabilisation, the building-up of an international 
economic credibility, the level of public deficit and public debt – both are supposed to be kept under 
strict limits by the EU enlargement agenda – the quality of the financial system and the efficiency of 
prudential rules… But for what regards candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe, perhaps the 
most important feature is that those countries are going to be members of the EU. As such, they are 
requested to proceed to an orderly liberalization of capital flows, medium and long term flows in a 
first stage, with the option of applying for a temporary derogation regarding certain type of capital 
during the first years of memberships (in sensitive sectors or acquisition of some types of real estate). 
They are also supposed to prepare themselves for the adoption of the euro, which means renouncing to 
the monetary policy autonomy in a world of high capital mobility23. Under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, they could in principle regain a full autonomy over the monetary policy, but at the cost of 
increased financial instability, exchange rate fluctuations, and fluctuations in macroeconomic 
variables, which are associated to losses. Perhaps more importantly the resulting insulation from the 
European monetary market is not compatible with the perspective of joining the European Union. In 
addition, while CEECs have rather low public debt ratios (see table 6), the debts tend to be mainly in 
foreign currencies. Servicing the latter depends upon the changes in the exchange rates, which under 
flexible exchange rate regimes are likely to be quite large and volatile in such emerging and peripheral 
countries like the CEECs24. 
 
In what follows we propose to assess the impact of the mobility of capital on the exchange rate regime 
choice. The assumption we are going to test is that the increase in financial integration has pushed 
CEECs towards the adoption of fixed exchange rate regimes. The opposite could have been observed. 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 Szapary [2002] reports that according to different studies the estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson effect vary 
between 2 and 4%. This translates into pressures on the real exchange rate of the order of one percent per year 
(Coricelli [2002, page 411]).  
22 Which would justify maintaining some capital controls on a unilateral basis: see Rodrick [1997] and Bhagwati 
[1998]. 
23 This latter strategy might have some risks associated with the probability of facing speculative attacks during 
the ERMII phase. 
24 The idea that flexible exchange rate permit independence in monetary policy is criticized vigourosly by 
Coricelli [2002], on the basis that large capital inflows imply balance of payment crisis and exchange rate 
adjustments.  
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More financial integration could have been associated with more flexibility as a way of regaining over 
the monetary independence. But as emphasised before this would not have fitted the Eastern European 
agenda of entering the Europe25. In other words the specificity of the CEECs is that they face and will 
continue to face a dramatic increase in financial integration (and financial instability) within the 
European frontiers, which make inefficient both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes and oblige 
them to give up the use of the monetary and fiscal policy as a way of absorbing asymmetric shocks26. 
Given the institutional features of the EU enlargement, which requires the adoption of the monetary 
part of the Acquis Communautaire (adoption of the euro), the increase in capital mobility and the 
ongoing neutrality of exchange rate regime should be associated with more fixity.  
 
For testing this assumption we correlate an exchange rate regime variable with the indicator of 
international financial integration FIN proposed in Feldstein and Horioka [1980], which is the absolute 
difference between saving and investment rates in percent of GDP. If incremental saving tends to be 
invested in the country of origin, differences among countries in investment rates should reflect 
closely differences in saving rates, and the indicator should be biased towards zero. Conversely the 
higher the degree of international financial integration, the more the indicator moves away from nil. 
The IMF Exchange Rate Regime Classification Exch.Rate (see table 5) is a discrete variable taking 
value from one (dollarization or Euroization) to eight, which corresponds to the most flexible regime 
(independent float). We regress Exch.Rate on FIN and on variables measuring the asymmetry of 
demand itDS  and supply shocks itSS . Demand and Supply shocks allow controlling for the level of 
asymmetry - more symmetry favouring the choice of a fixed exchange rate regime. The coefficient 
itDS  ( itSS ) takes values from zero to one. The closest to zero is the coefficient, the highest is the 
level of convergence27. The sample contains eight transition countries28 from 1995 to 2001, and the 
data are quarterly. We run both OLS and ordered probit.  
 
( )3.. EquSSDSFINRateExch ititititit +++= γβα  
 
Results in table 7 support the view that the increase in capital mobility has been accompanied by a 
move towards more fix exchange rate regimes. In Babetski et alii [2002] it is assumed that demand 
                                                 
25 Flandreau and Maurel [2001] emphasise that entering a Currency Union is not a matter of economic rationale, 
it is essentially a political choice. This assumption allows them to specify the instruments they use in order to 
properly estimate the impact of memberships into a Currency Union on trade. Here we argue that once countries 
have choosen to adopt the euro, that is to loose the monetary policy instrument, they are more prone to fix the 
currency when the financial constraint is more binding.  
26 One could imagine that the requirement for being member of the EU would be to implement flexible exchange 
rate regimes, which would make fiscal policy inoperant, and to use monetary policy strictly for stabilisation 
purposes.  
27 The latter are taken from Babetski et alii [2002], and the methodology is described in more details in Annex 2. 
28 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, The Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
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shocks are very much conditioned by the nature of the monetary regime, whereas supply shocks are 
reflecting the process of transition towards the market. The positive correlation between the 
convergence of demand shocks and the exchange rate regime variable corresponds to the very product 
of the alignment of CEECs monetary policy on the EU monetary policy, and therefore to the setting-
up of fixed exchange rate regimes. More demand symmetric countries tend indeed to fix their 
currencies.  
 
Supply shocks reflect more fundamental variables, for instance productivity gains occurring only in 
transition countries. According to discussion in section 3, they are not expected being correlated with 
the choice of any particular exchange rate regime. We interpret there the negative and significant 
estimate between the divergence of supply shocks and the exchange rate regime variable as reflecting 
the fact that more asymmetric countries in the sample, Bulgaria and the three Baltic States, have 
tended to fix their currencies. Another interpretation relies on the argument raised by Mundell (1973), 
according to which more asymmetric countries have better to fix their currency in order to share the 
risk and diversify their portfolio.  
 
Table 7 Probability of exchange rate regime i being observed 
Explanatory variables: OLS Ordered Probit OLS Ordered Probit 
Financial Integration -0.15 
(-4.43) 
-0.09 
(-3.87) 
-0.16 
(-4.41) 
-0.08 
(-3.37) 
Coefficient of supply shock asymmetry 
with the EU 
-1.52 
(-4.61) 
-0.69 
(-3.05) 
  
Coefficient of demand shock asymmetry 
with the EU 
2.60 
(6.43) 
1.62 
(5.70) 
  
Coefficient of supply shock asymmetry 
with Germany 
  -2.38 
(-6.52) 
-1.40 
(-5.48) 
Coefficient of demand shock asymmetry 
with Germany 
  2.92 
(5.31) 
1.55 
(4.00) 
Number of Observations 216 216 203 203 
R-Squared  0.31 0.09 0.33 0.10 
T or Z-Statistics in brackets 
The exchange rate regime takes values from 1 (euroization) to 8 (independent floating) 
Coefficients supply and demand shocks asymmetry are taken from Babetski et alii [2002], see Annex 2. 
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Conclusion 
The greater diversity of exchange rate regimes across CEECs is striking if one considers that those 
countries have achieved similar restructuring, institutional reforms, and macroeconomic stabilization. 
This paper goes further and asks the question of the optimal exchange rate regime during the process 
of the EU enlargement. It emphasizes that in the European context, which is a context of perfect 
capital mobility in the sense of Feldstein and Horioka [1980], the idea that the choice of the exchange 
rate regime, whatever flexible or fixed, matters for dealing with asymmetric shocks, turns out to be an 
illusion. On the other hand one important institutional and political feature of the EU enlargement is 
the subsequent adoption of the EMU. The latter is crucial for understanding why the nineties and the 
ongoing (as well as expected further) increase in financial integration have been characterized by a 
significant move towards more fix exchange rate regimes, as shown in section 3.  
 
As in Nuti [2002] and Coricelli [2002], this paper supports the view that an early adoption of the euro 
is the optimal strategy for emerging countries, peripheral to the wide European market and highly 
vulnerable to capital switches. It stresses the point that the ex post opportunity cost of adopting the 
euro is very low. If the ex post degree of capital mobility can be expected to be that currently observed 
within European countries indeed, as calculated in section 2, then there will be no room left for 
conducting any monetary policy insulated from the rest of the Union (the same acknowledgement of 
inefficiency would apply to more flexible exchange rate regimes and their associated fiscal policy). 
The rationale for ERMII is very low if one considers like the author of this paper that the assumption 
that financial and monetary markets are related to fundamentals, at least in the short run, does not 
hold. Furthermore one important contribution of this paper is to emphasize that what really drives the 
choice of the exchange rate regime is the political decision to enter the EU and subsequently to adopt 
all the Acquis Communautaire. Put in other words the perceived gains are so large tat they outweigh 
the risk of fixing the exchange rate at an inappropriate level.   
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Annex 1 
 
Table 3 Inflation rate1 (% change, annual averages) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria 26.3 414.4 91.3 72.9 95.9 62.2 121.6 1058.4 18.7 2.6 10.3 7.4 5.8 
Czech Rep. 9.7 52.0 11.1 20.8 9.9 9.1 8.9 8.4 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 2.2 
Hungary 39.2 34.8 23.2 22.5 18.9 28.3 23.6 18.3 14.1 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3 
Poland 553.6 76.8 45.3 36.9 33.3 28.0 19.8 15.1 11.7 7.3 10.1 5.5 2.2 
Romania 5.1 170.2 210.4 256.1 136.8 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 23.0 
Slovakia 10.8 61.2 10.0 23.2 13.4 10.0 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.5 12.0 7.1 3.3 
Slovenia 551.6 115.0 207.3 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.9 8.4 7.9 6.1 8.9 8.4 7.4 
Estonia 23.1 211.0 1077.7 89.8 47.6 29.0 23.0 11.2 8.2 3.3 4.0 5.8 3.5 
Latvia 10.5 172 951 109 35.9 25.0 17.6 8.6 4.5 2.4 2.7 2.5 1.6 
Lithuania 8.4 225 1021 410 72.2 39.6 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.4 
 CEECs average 
excl. Bulgaria  
and Romania 
151 119 418 93.1 31.5 22.8 16.7 10.6 8.6 5.3 6.6 5.6 3.2 
Euro area 
average 
4.6 4.1 4.6 3.9 3.2 3.0 2.5 1.9 1.4 1.2 2.4 2.7 2.1 
EU average 5.1 4.7 4.5 3.7 2.9 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.4 1.2 2.1 2.5 2.0 
"3 best EU" av.2 4.3 4.1 4.4 3.5 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.1 0.8 1.7 2.1 1.4 
   
Notes: 1 Percentage change in consumer price index in local currency (period average), over previous year. 
 2 Three "best performing EU countries" with lowest inflation in 2002 are 
 United Kingdom, Germany and Austria 
  
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; EBRD Transition Report, 2001; Babetski, Boone, 
Maurel [2002] computations 
 
Table 4 Volatility of nominal exchange rates1 (%) 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria  n.a. 24.5 5.5 39.7 20.1 77.0 85.6 15.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Czech Rep.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 1.2 1.0 4.4 4.3 2.9 2.6 2.8 5.5 
Hungary  8.0 6.2 4.4 9.6 16.0 10.3 5.8 7.9 4.3 1.8 2.3 3.4 
Poland  6.9 17.3 12.6 14.5 9.5 4.9 5.7 4.7 5.4 3.7 5.6 5.1 
Romania  94.7 77.5 48.5 41.7 19.2 22.1 36.9 14.8 26.7 13.2 14.8 10.1 
Slovakia  n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.9 1.6 0.9 1.5 3.9 6.7 2.8 1.6 1.7 
Slovenia  n.a. n.a. 14.4 8.4 2.1 5.6 3.2 2.0 2.4 3.5 3.4 2.2 
Estonia  n.a. n.a. 2.1 0.8 1.6 1.3 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.1 
Latvia  n.a. n.a. 17.1 13.8 2.5 1.3 3.4 2.0 3.8 6.4 2.6 2.5 
Lithuania  n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.5 6.4 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6 2.7 
CEECs average  36.5 31.4 14.9 14.4 8.0 12.7 15.4 5.9 5.8 4.3 3.9 3.4 
US  5.8 5.8 6.5 3.7 5.9 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6 4.4 
 
Note: 1 Standard deviations in percent  to  average nominal exchange rates to ECU/Euro over two  preceding 
years 
Source: Babetski, Boone, Maurel [2002]  computations based on the IMF International Financial Statistics, 
November  2002, monthly averages 
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Table 5 Exchange rate regimes in the CEECs 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Czech Rep. 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 7 7 7 7 8 7 
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 
Poland 3 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 
Romania 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 
Slovakia 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 
Slovenia n.a n.a 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Estonia n.a. n.a. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Latvia n.a n.a 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Lithuania n.a n.a 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
IMF Exchange Rate Regime Classification 
1: Dollarization, no separate legal tender 
2: Currency Board, currency fully backed by foreign exchange reserves 
3: Conventional Fixed Pegs, peg to another currency or currency basket within a band of at most ±1% 
4: Horizontal Bands, pegs with bands larger than  ±1% 
5: Crawling Pegs, pegs with central  parity periodically adjusted in fixed amounts at a fixed, pre-announced rate 
or in response to changes in selected quantitative indicators 
6: Crawling Bands, crawling pegs combined with bands of more than ±1% 
7: Managed Float with No Preannounced Exchange Rate Path, active intervention without precommitment to a 
preannounced target or path for the exchange rate 
8: Independent Float, market-determined exchange rate and monetary policy independent of exchange rate 
policy. 
Sources:  
1990 – 2001: Begg D., Eichengreen B., Halpern L., von Hagen J., Wyplosz, C.  2002. “Sustainable Regime of 
Capital Movements in Accession Countries”   Table 2. Exchange Rate Regimes in accession states. 
2002: Babetski, Boone, Maurel [2002] updates.  
 
Table 6 Public debt*** (% GDP) 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 158,7 150.1 169.0 114.7 300.5 103.0 79.8 84.9 77.1 70.2 66.0 
Czech Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18,8 17,6 15,3 13.7 13.5 13.7 15.0 18.8 23.0 30.6 
Hungary n.a. 74.6 79.0 90.4 88.2 86.4 72.8 63.9 62.3 61.2 55.6 54.1 57.6 
Poland n.a. n.a. 147,3 88,7 72.4 54.3 47.9 46.9 42.9 43.4 39.6 40.4 44.9 
Romania n.a. 10.7 25.7 24.8 21.6 26.2 33.4 32.8 32.3 32.7 31.5 31.2 31.7 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.5 35.8 35.6 35.1 38.6 36.1 35.7 41.0 41.8 45.5 
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 45,6 33.7 28.4 28.0 29.6 31.9 32.6 35.5 36.8 36.4 34.4 
Estonia n.a. n.a. 3.3 5.1 4.7 4.5 5.0 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.2 16.2 14.5 12.0 10.4 13.1 13.3 15.0 14.9 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.8 15.8 19.5 23.2 19.1 22.4 28.3 28.2 26.9 24.4 
CEECs average n.a. 42.7 36.0 50.9 50.0 42.8 57.6 36.6 33.7 35.4 34.6 34.2 35.3 
Euro area 
average 
61.0 61.2 65.1 69.3 71.1 75.1 77.9 78.1 77.4 75.3 73.1 72.3 72.5 
EU average 58.0 58.5 63.1 68.1 69.3 73.2 75.2 74.8 74.3 71.4 68.7 67.7 67.4 
 
Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2002; EBRD Transition Report, 2001; Babetski, Boone, 
Maurel [2002] computations  
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Annex 2 
 
Babetski, Boone and Maurel [2002] methodology 
 
Following the literature derived from OCA theory that was used to assess the cost of EMU for “euroland 
countries”, we answer this question by assessing the differences in business cycles between the EU and 
the eastern countries29. The idea is that the closer the fluctuations of the countries, the more they will 
benefit from a common policy response. On the other hand, if shocks are asymmetric then giving up a tool 
of national policy management will be costly. A measure of the similarity of business cycles across 
countries is the correlation of demand shocks, and its evolution since the transition process began. 
Furthermore, with respect to transition countries, the similarity of supply shocks should also be analysed. 
The former will reflect temporary shock and hence the shape of the business cycle, while the second will 
represent the structural side of the economy.  
 
For current EMU countries, the exchange rate was mainly a demand stabilisation tool. For transition 
countries however, foregoing the exchange rate is foregoing a tool that was used to adjust both demand 
and supply shocks, as exchange rate policies have often been used to help address the adverse supply 
shocks of the transition towards a market economy, which rendered entire sectors non competitive. They 
consisted sometimes of huge devaluations (see Poland) to smooth the restructuring process and the 
increase in unemployment. In the long run, of course, the currency should return to its equilibrium value, 
which implies a steady appreciation as progress in restructuring is made, liquidation of uncompetitive 
sectors at world market clearing prices occurs, and there are productivity gains in the newly emerging 
private sector. This assumpion echoes the finding in Coricelli and Jazbec [2001], according to whom the 
real exchange rate behavior is influenced by structural reforms at the beginning of transition, but this 
influence diminishes over time, and its dynamics can be assimilated to that of previously acceding 
countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece. 
 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that demand shocks are very much conditioned by the nature of 
the monetary regime, whereas supply shocks are reflect the process of transition towards the market, as 
argued above. Distinguishing demand from supply shocks is therefore very important, since the former are 
likely to reflect an endogeneous process where the similarity of demand shocks is the very product of the 
alignment of CEECs monetary policy on the EU monetary policy, while the latter are informative about 
                                                 
29 For previous similar studies, see Boone [1997], Boone and Maurel [1999],  Horvath [2001]. 
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whether CEECs are still facing asymmetric shocks before entering the monetary union (once the 
convergence process has resumed). Therefore we take into account the fact that countries that share a 
common policy are likely to display the same (endogeneous) pattern of demand shocks as in the EU, while 
supply shocks are more likely to reflect productivity gains occurring only in transition countries, that is, to 
generate a certain level of asymmetry between EU member countries and CEECs. Babetski J and alii 
[2002]’s methodology consists of two steps. 
 
1) Following the methodology of Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1996], demand and supply shocks are 
estimated with a VAR model for the accession countries, United States and the aggregate EU-15 as 
alternative benchmarks. Because the sample largely covers the transition period, one expects the 
correlation coefficients between countries to be rather weak for both types of shocks [Horvath, 2001].  
  
2) In a second step, following Boone (1997) time-varying estimation (Kalman filter) allows to compute 
“time-varying correlation coefficients”. More formally, the time varying a(t) and b(t) coefficients in 
equation (1) are estimated, and their evolution is analysed over time: 
 
)()()()( USEUiCEECsEU XXtbtaXX −⋅+=−        (1) 
  
For a convergence process to be at work, both b(t) and a(t) must tend towards zero, as this will mean that 
the shock X(CEEC(i)) is entirely explained by the reference (EU) shock. Furthermore, the more b(t) 
diverges from zero and tends towards one, the more important the rest of the world is (here proxied by the 
United States) in contributing to the shocks affecting the eastern country.30  
 
The results show that supply shocks coefficients b(t) increase or remain stable over time as long as the 
transition process evolves; for demand shocks, b(t) start from a relatively high level, and then decrease 
over time as the monetary integration deepens. This means that demand shocks in the candidate country 
and reference country are getting closer and therefore can be addressed by a common monetary policy, 
while supply shocks have to be addressed through internal adjustments.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 For details on the VAR methodology, see Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1996] and Boone and Maurel [1998]; for 
details on the application of the Kalman filter to this analysis, see Boone [1997}. 
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Supply shocks, convergence to the EU (0 = convergence, 1 = divergence)  
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Demand shocks, convergence to the EU (0 = convergence, 1 = divergence) 
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Supply shocks, convergence to Germany (0 = convergence, 1 = divergence) 
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Demand shocks, convergence to Germany (0 = convergence, 1 = divergence) 
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